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SPIES IN THE SKIES: DIRTBOXES AND AIRPLANE 
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 
Brian L. Owsley* 
INTRODUCTION 
Electronic surveillance in the digital age is essentially a cat-and-mouse 
game between governmental agencies that are developing new techniques 
and technologies for surveillance, juxtaposed against privacy rights 
advocates who voice concerns about such technologies. In November 2014, 
there was a discovery of a new twist on a relatively old theme. 
Recently, the Wall Street Journal reported that the U.S. Marshals Service 
was running a surveillance program employing devices—dirtboxes—that 
gather all cell phone numbers in the surrounding area.1 Other federal 
agencies, including the Drug Enforcement Agency, Immigration and 
Custom Enforcement, and the Department of Homeland Security, are also 
documented to have used dirtboxes.2 These dirtboxes are manufactured by 
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 1. Devlin Barrett, Americans’ Cellphones Targeted in Secret U.S. Spy Program, WALL 
ST. J. (Nov. 13, 2014, 8:22 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/americans-cellphones-targeted-
in-secret-u-s-spy-program-1415917533 [http://perma.cc/C95M-A4B5]; see also Sam Frizell, Is 
the Government’s Aerial Smartphone Surveillance Program Legal?, TIME (Nov. 15, 2014), 
http://time.com/3586511/government-aerial-surveillance/ [http://perma.cc/WX9W-JEM4]; 
Gail Sullivan, Report: Secret Government Program Uses Aircraft for Mass Cellphone 
Surveillance, WASH. POST, (Nov. 14, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2014/11/14/report-secret-government-program-uses-aircraft-for-mass-cellphone-
surveillance/ [http://perma.cc/578F-RSFS]; Trevor Timm, First Snowden. Then Tracking You 
on Wheels. Now Spies on a Plane. Yes, Surveillance is Everywhere, GUARDIAN (Nov. 15, 2014, 
8:30 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/nov/15/spies-plane-surveillance-
us-marshals [http://perma.cc/89HM-VAJE]; Kim Zetter, The Feds Are Now Using ‘Stingrays’ in 
Planes to Spy on Our Phone Calls, WIRED (Nov. 14, 2014, 2:14 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/2014/11/feds-motherfng-stingrays-motherfng-planes/ 
[http://perma.cc/5NDU-WEXR]. 
 2. Timm, supra note 1; Patrick Gallagher, CIA and DOJ May Face Litigation over 
“Dirtbox” Cell Spying Technology, JOLT DIGEST (Mar. 17, 2015), 
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Digital Receiver Technology (DRT), a subsidiary of Boeing. Dirtboxes get 
their name based on the acronym of the three letters.3 The U.S. Marshals 
Service uses these dirtboxes to gather information on the locations or the cell 
phone numbers of criminal suspects and fugitives. 
To understand how dirtboxes are used, imagine you are attending some 
kind of protest. While you are involved in that event, you notice a small 
airplane overhead. You think nothing of the airplane and soon turn your 
attention back to the event. That seemingly innocuous aircraft happens to be 
a government airplane with a dirtbox aboard. Using this device, law 
enforcement have been gathering cell phone data from all of those who 
attended the protest. Perhaps they are looking for a specific individual or 
two, but now they have your cell phone information along with all the other 
protestors. 
I. DIRTBOX TECHNOLOGY AND OPERATION 
A dirtbox is a two-foot-square box that operates like a cell site simulator 
(also known as a StingRay) by mimicking a cell phone tower.4 The device is 
attached to a small plane such as a Cessna that flies over a target area 
believed to contain the individual subject of the investigation.5 Specifically, 
“the devices force every cell phone in a region to connect to them.”6 In order 
to do so, the device briefly jams the signals of nearby cell towers and then 
requires all cell phones in a given radius to register with the dirtbox, thus 
obtaining data from not only the subject of the criminal investigation, but 
also from all nontargeted cell phone users in the immediate vicinity.7 
Little information exists about StingRays. There is growing anecdotal 
evidence in media outlets about the public’s concern regarding the use of 
StingRays,8 but the information available in the public record no doubt 
 
http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/privacy/flash-digest-news-in-brief-180 
[http://perma.cc/BVZ7-BX32]; Julian Hattem, Dem Senators Warn Cellphone Tracking Could 
Violate Constitution, THE HILL (Dec. 14, 2014, 5:58 PM), 
http://thehill.com/policy/technology/226711-dem-senators-fear-cell-trackers-could-violate-
constitution [http://perma.cc/ULP9-CK8X]. 
 3. Barrett, supra note 1. 
 4. Zetter, supra note 1; see also Brian L. Owsley, TriggerFish, StingRays, and Fourth 
Amendment Fishing Expeditions, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 183, 191–94 (2014) (discussing how 
StingRay devices work); Timm, supra note 1 ( “The plane surveillance operation’s on-the-
ground-forebearer[,] commonly known as a [StingRay], . . . is like a dirtbox on wheels . . . .”). 
 5. Barrett, supra note 1. 
 6. Zetter, supra note 1. 
 7. Barrett, supra note 1; see also Owsley, supra note 4, at 191–94. 
 8. See, e.g., Michael Bott & Thom Jensen, Cellphone Spying Technology Being Used 
Throughout Northern California, NEWS10 (Mar. 6, 2014, 11:25 PM), 
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accounts for just a fraction of the use of such technology. Only a few 
published decisions have addressed StingRays,9 and some courts have dealt 
with applications for authorization to use StingRays in electronic 
surveillance.10 However, it is unknown how often the U.S. Marshals Service 
or other federal agencies use this technology. 
There are no court decisions addressing the use of dirtboxes. Moreover, 
it is unclear whether law enforcement officials even seek judicial 
authorization prior to using dirtboxes. It is unclear how often these flights 
occur, but they apparently take place on a regular basis.11 With this dearth of 
information regarding the use of dirtboxes, including the authority for such 
usage, it is important to consider the constitutional implications of 
dirtboxes. 
II. APPLYING FOURTH AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES TO DIRTBOXES 
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures.”12 It further mandates that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause.”13 As discussed below, the use of a dirtbox constitutes a 
Fourth Amendment search.14 
 
http://www.news10.net/story/news/investigations/watchdog/2014/03/06/cellphone-spying-
technology-used-throughout-northern-california/6144949/ [http://perma.cc/35UV-M8PR]; 
Hanni Fakhoury, Stingrays Go Mainstream: 2014 in Review, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. 
(Jan. 2, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/01/2014-review-stingrays-go-mainstream 
[https://perma.cc/7XXU-NAUY] (discussing discoveries of law enforcement’s use of StingRays 
in Florida, Maryland, and Washington); Jace Larson, Houston police chief answers questions 
about cellphone surveillance program, KPRC HOUSTON (Nov. 19, 2014, 7:09 p.m.), 
http://www.click2houston.com/news/investigates/houston-police-have-cell-phone-
surveillance-program/29807376 [http://perma.cc/VB7M-MTU4]. 
 9. See In re the Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use 
of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d 747, 748 (S.D. Tex. 2012); U.S. v. 
Rigmaiden, 844 F. Supp. 2d 982, 995 (D. Ariz. 2012) (FBI used a cell site simulator to track 
defendant’s Verizon aircard); see also In re Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device 
with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 755 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (“[A] ‘TriggerFish’ . . . 
enables law enforcement to gather cell site data directly, without the assistance of the service 
provider.”); In re the Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing Use of a Cellular 
Telephone Digital Analyzer, 885 F. Supp. 197, 198–99 (1995) (“[A] . . . ‘digital analyzer’ is a 
portable device that can detect signals emitted by a cellular telephone.”). 
 10. Owsley, supra note 4, at 200–11 (discussing StingRay applications in various courts). 
 11. Barrett, supra note 1. 
 12. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 13. Id.; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (addressing the issuance of warrants, including for 
the seizure of electronically stored information). 
 14. See infra notes 16–46 and accompanying text; see also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 
2473, 2485 (2014) (holding that the Fourth Amendment requires police officers to obtain a 
warrant before searching the data on a cell phone). 
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Since the 1967 decision in Katz v. United States,15 the Supreme Court 
has used a “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard to determine 
whether governmental action constitutes a search pursuant to the Fourth 
Amendment.16 In Terry v. Ohio,17 the Supreme Court reiterated and re-
affirmed this standard.18 Furthermore, in United States v. Jacobsen,19 the 
Court explained that “[a] ‘search’ occurs when an expectation of privacy that 
society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.”20 Thus, a primary 
question regarding whether dirtboxes constitute a search is if they violate a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. 
The Supreme Court has previously addressed surveillance by airplanes. 
In California v. Ciraolo,21 police officers learned that Ciraolo was growing 
marijuana in the backyard and hiding it from terrestrial view by fences.22 
Officers trained in the identification of marijuana flew 1,000 feet above the 
fenced area and were able to secure photographic evidence of marijuana 
plants.23 Based on evidence gathered from this airplane surveillance, police 
officers obtained a search warrant for the residence, seized seventy-three 
marijuana plants, and charged Ciraolo with the offense.24 He subsequently 
filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless search 
of his backyard, but the trial court denied his motion, and Ciraolo ultimately 
pled guilty.25 
 
 15. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 16. Katz, 389 U.S. 347 at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“I join the opinion of the Court, 
which I read to hold only . . . that an enclosed telephone booth is an area where, like a home, 
and unlike a field, a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of 
privacy . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 17. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 18. Terry, 392 U.S. at 9 (“We have recently held that ‘the Fourth Amendment protects 
people, not places,’ and wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable ‘expectation of 
privacy.’ ” (citations omitted) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351; Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., 
concurring))) 
 19. 466 U.S. 109 (1984). 
 20. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113 (citations omitted); see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 
143 n.12 (1978) (“[Legitimate] expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the 
Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to 
understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.”). 
 21. 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
 22. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 209–10. 
 25. Id. at 210. 
April 2015] Spies in the Skies 79 
In analyzing the issue, the Ciraolo Court relied on Katz to consider 
whether Ciraolo had a reasonable expectation of privacy.26 The Court found 
that Ciraolo had a subjective expectation of privacy in his backyard, but that 
society would not recognize this expectation as reasonable.27 Relying on 
United States v. Knotts,28 the Ciraolo Court held that the curtilage of the 
home does not by itself guarantee protection from law enforcement 
observation, as police officers are not required to shield their eyes from 
viewing such areas if they are lawfully entitled to be in the place from which 
the observation occurs.29 Because the officers were on an airplane in public 
airspace viewing Ciraolo’s property with their naked eyes, the Court 
concluded that the airplane surveillance did not violate his Fourth 
Amendment rights.30 
Similarly, in Florida v. Riley,31 the Court again grappled with whether 
the use of a helicopter to discover marijuana plants violated the Fourth 
Amendment. The county sheriff received an anonymous tip that Riley was 
growing marijuana in the greenhouse located on the five acres behind his 
mobile home.32 Although the greenhouse was obscured on two sides by 
walls, the other two sides were open but obscured from the ground-level 
view by trees and the mobile home.33 Based on the tip, a sheriff’s deputy flew 
400 feet over the greenhouse and identified marijuana growing with his 
naked eye.34 As a result, the sheriff’s department obtained a search warrant 
for the greenhouse and located the marijuana, leading to charges against 
Riley for possession of marijuana.35 The trial court granted Riley’s motion to 
suppress, but the Florida appellate court reversed before certifying the 
question to the state supreme court, which quashed the reversal and 
reinstated the trial court’s order granting Riley’s motion to suppress.36 
The Riley Court analyzed the question pursuant to Katz by addressing 
whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy from the surveillance 
by helicopter.37 Relying on Ciraolo, the Court concluded that there was no 
 
 26. Id. at 211 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)). 
 27. Id. at 211–12. 
 28. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 29. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213 (citing Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282). 
 30. Id. at 213–15. 
 31. 488 U.S. 445 (1989). 
 32. Riley, 488 U.S. at 448. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 448–49. 
 36. Id. at 449. 
 37. Id. 
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Fourth Amendment violation because the helicopter was lawfully in the 
airspace above the property.38 
In addition to Katz, the Court’s third party doctrine jurisprudence 
informs the question of the constitutionality of dirtboxes. In Smith v. 
Maryland, the Court undermined personal privacy rights by holding that the 
third party doctrine applied to the numbers that one dials on a telephone. In 
that case, the Court addressed whether the use of a pen register to obtain the 
suspect’s dialed telephone numbers without a search warrant violated the 
Fourth Amendment.39 Ultimately, the Court concluded that the installation 
of the pen register was not a Fourth Amendment search because the suspect 
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his outgoing call log.40 
Moreover, as Knotts established a few years later, law enforcement officers 
have a right to view activity that is clearly visible to the public.41 
Arguably, the combination of Knotts and Smith would contravene the 
conclusion that the use of dirtboxes is problematic, but the Court has 
recently issued a few decisions that call into question the rigidity of the third 
party doctrine. In United States v. Jones,42 the Court considered whether law 
enforcement officers could use GPS to track a criminal suspect without a 
warrant.43 In writing for the majority, Justice Scalia distinguished Knotts 
from Jones because Knotts was based on the Katz reasonable expectation of 
privacy test as opposed to common law trespass.44 
Additionally, in Riley v. California, the Court considered whether a 
police officer’s warrantless search of a suspect’s cell phone violated the 
Fourth Amendment.45 Because cell phones, which the Court described as 
minicomputers, have a large storage capacity, they hold very large amounts 
of private personal records.46 Indeed, based on this large storage capacity, the 
Court concluded that a cell phone could hold thousands of personal records 
such that it was not analogous to circumstances in earlier third party 
 
 38. Id. at 449–52. 
 39. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979). 
 40. Id. at 745–46. 
 41. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983). 
 42. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 43. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. 
 44. Id. at 952 (discussing Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278). 
 45. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014). 
 46. Id. at 2489–91; see also Charles E. MacLean, But Your Honor, a Cell Phone is not a 
Cigarette Pack: An Immodest Call for a Return to the Chimel Justifications for Cell Phone 
Memory Searches Incident to Lawful Arrest, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 41, 62 (2012) (“Cell phones 
are more like extensive computers than wallets.”); Owsley, supra note 4, at 226–27 (noting that 
the Court viewed cell phones as “essentially small computers that stored immense amounts of 
data and information”). 
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doctrine cases.47 Thus, in holding that the warrantless search of cell phones 
violated the Fourth Amendment, the Court undercut the third party 
doctrine. 
There are no exceptions to the warrant requirement that apply to 
searches using dirtboxes. Although cell phone users authorize their cell 
phones to register with their nearest telecommunications provider’s cell 
towers, that authorization is not the same as consenting to the release of the 
cell phone user’s data to law enforcement using a fake cell tower and dirtbox 
device. Indeed, the data obtained by the devices, like GPS tracking and cell 
phone searches, exceeds any basis to justify a search or seizure from the fact 
that the cell phone registers with cell towers. 
III. SAFEGUARDING INDIVIDUALS’ REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY 
Warrantless searches of cell phones using a dirtbox are no different than 
warrantless searches using a StingRay. At least one court has rejected the use 
of StingRays without a warrant.48 In light of Riley and Jones, the government 
should, absent exigent circumstances, obtain a warrant for the use of a 
StingRay. Similarly, the government should also obtain a search warrant in 
order to use a dirtbox. 
It is unclear what judicial authority, if any, the federal government is 
seeking when using a dirtbox. In seeking authorization to use a StingRay, the 
federal government typically bases it application on the pen register statute. 
However, in order to obtain a pen register “the attorney for the 
Government” must simply certify “that the information likely to be obtained 
by such installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal 
investigation.”49 This is an extremely low standard that results in almost all 
pen register applications being granted, but is much too low for 
authorization of a StingRay or a dirtbox because they are capable of 
obtaining a greater amount of data, some of which is arguably private, from 
a greater number of citizens.50 
Instead, judicial authorization of a StingRay or a dirtbox should be based 
on a probable cause standard and any search warrants issued should state 
 
 47. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493; see also MacLean, supra, note 46, at 61 (dismissing any 
analogy because “[a] cell phone can hold millions of pages of data, while a wallet may hold a 
few”). 
 48. In re the Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use of a 
Pen Register & Trace & Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d 747, 752 (S.D. Tex. 2012). 
 49. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2); Owsley, supra note 4, at 199. 
 50. Owsley, supra note 4, at 199–200; Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through 
Cyberlaw’s Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1375, 1431 (2004) (“[T]he statute does not appear to 
require the judge to independently assess the factual predicate for the government’s 
certification.”). 
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with particularity the areas that may be searched.51 Similarly, because the use 
of a dirtbox and the gathering of cell phone data constitute a Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure, the Fourth Amendment applies to any use 
of it by the government, whether done in an application or not. 
In addition to the search warrant, courts issuing orders authorizing 
dirtboxes should also be mindful of the capture by law enforcement officials 
of personal information and data regarding nontargeted individuals. In 
other words, as the Cessna with the dirtbox swoops near you at the protest, 
all of your cell phone’s data are captured and potentially stored on 
government computers in perpetuity. To protect against this concern, strict 
guidelines should be adopted regulating the use and admissibility of 
information obtained with a dirtbox. 
Of course, there may be times in which law enforcement legitimately 
needs to use an electronic surveillance device like a dirtbox and can satisfy a 
court’s probable cause standard. There still needs to be some protection for 
gathering data from nontargeted individuals. Consequently, courts should 
implement a protocol safeguarding these third parties and their data 
whenever they issue orders authorizing the use of a dirtbox.52 For example, a 
court could order law enforcement officials to “return any and all original 
records and copies, whether hardcopy or in electronic format or storage, to 
the Provider, which are determined to be not relevant to the Investigative 
Agency’s investigation.”53 Former U.S. Magistrate Judge Facciola explained 
that a protocol was necessary because “some safeguards must be put in place 
to prevent the government from collecting and keeping indefinitely 
information to which it has no right.”54 
 
 51. Owsley, supra note 4, at 230–31; In re the Application of the U.S. for an Order 
Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register & Trace & Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d 
at 752 (rejecting a StingRay application based on the pen register statute in favor of a search 
warrant based on the Fourth Amendment). 
 52. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), 964 
F. Supp. 2d 674, 678 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (“Although the use of a court-sanctioned cell tower dump 
invariably leads to such information being provided to the Government, in order to receive 
such data, the Government at a minimum should have a protocol to address how to handle this 
sensitive private information.”); In re U.S. ex rel. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), 
930 F. Supp. 2d 698, 702 (S.D. Tex. 2012); see also Owsley, The Fourth Amendment 
Implications of the Government’s Use of Cell Tower Dumps in its Electronic Surveillance, 16 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 46 (2013) (recommending a protocol be designed for courts authorizing cell 
tower dumps). 
 53. Cf. In re Search of Cellular Telephone Towers, 945 F. Supp. 2d 769, 771 (S.D. Tex. 
2013) (giving the same instructions in an order authorizing the government to access historical 
cell site records at cell towers near a crime scene). 
 54. In re Search of Information Associated with the Facebook Account Identified by the 
Username Aaron.Alexis, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2013). 
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CONCLUSION 
Dirtboxes are here. Just like Pandora’s Box, once they have been opened, 
they cannot be closed. The goal going forward is not only to ensure that law 
enforcement officials seek judicial authorization before using them, but also 
that they comply with the Fourth Amendment. In addition to requiring a 
demonstration of probable cause along with a particularized search warrant, 
the issuing court should establish a strict protocol to protect nontargeted 
individuals from law enforcement officials mining their data. Any protocol 
should provide guidelines for what to do with this captured data to ensure 
that it does not end up in government databases. 
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